Abstract: In this extended abstract we intend to show that, in several of the Latin American (LA) countries, the outcomes that may derived from the interactions between Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and the ever widening variety of interest groups that are part of civil society are deeply influenced by the recipient country's government political and economic attitudes regarding Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). There are other effective ways to reduce the non commercial risks that FDIs, even when MNCs from environmentally ill reputed industries are involved, confront in the region: the Social License to Operate (SLO). Our research, in the form of a case study, analyzes the processes by which two different mining MNCs implemented their respective projects; the presence or absence of the SLO, as part of their corporate ethical behavior, led to polar outcomes: how and why that happened is the subject of Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488624 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488624 our research.
Social License to Operate
Environmental Non Governmental Organizations' (ENGOs) members and sympathizers are reluctant to concede that corporate profits may be positively linked with sound environmental performance; instead, they uphold that more stringent standards and regulations in developed countries provoked a corporate migration flow to what they catalogue as pollution havens in less developed societies. ENGOs' partisanship emphasize that the only way to make polluters comply is by means of an extremely stringent set of environmental regulations and standards that structure a command and control scheme based on governmental agencies -local, state and federal-with overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities (Coglianese, 2002; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2007 This gap is, among others, a superabundant source of individual and societal demands for adjustments; that societal pressure leads firms to respond, as effectively as possible, to two volatile sets of demands: the frequently changing governmental regulations and the ever evolving requirements of neighboring communities (Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2004) ; accordingly, firms' managers must deal with the constraints posed by the natural and the social context within which they operate (Kagan, 2003) .
Firms' executives are continuously delineating a new corporate environmental management standard and opting to go beyond compliance of the prevalent governmental regulations, regardless of their stringency, rather than strictly fulfilling them, in order to respond to the increasingly more severe societal pressures (Gunningham, Kagan & Thorton, 2004; Hoffman & Bazerman, 2005; Howard-Grenville, Nash. & Coglianese, 2006) . 
Method
In order to progress in our research we will conduct an empirical case study combining multiple data collection methods (Eisenhardt, 1989) ; our aim is to study how instrumental is the corporate ethical behavior in the process of earning the SLO for each project and how firms manage governmental intervention along it. We consider the case study method a suitable research strategy to accomplish our purpose; the case study method, as Robert K. Yin (1981) The case study method is the most appropriate means to address how and why questions regarding a set of facts (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Thus, we propose an explanatory analysis of two FDI mining projects, to compare similarities and differences -that led to polar outcomes-between them (Pettigrew, 1990). As Yin (2003) stated:
... case studies, like experiments are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a "sample" and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)... (Yin 2003:10).
At a first stage, we examined an ample scope of secondary sources of information, such as public documents, reports or books from both MNCs, from both LA countries' national mining authorities and from international and national ENGOs in order to confirm or contradict, to "triangulate", the information gathered (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) . Social License to Operate
In a second phase we plan to conduct a mail survey amongst officials of the governments' mining officials, corporate executives and the leadership of the communities' opposing groups that claimed being affected by the FDI projects. The questionnaires will include two sets of open and close ended questions around a few main themes: the ways in which the respondents think that the firm's precedent ethical behavior -the corporate reputation-facilitated or not the process to acquire or not the SLO for the analyzed projects; the interviewees' judgments about the relevance -within their organization and/or for themselves-of the SLO along the lifecycle of each corporate operation; their views about why most mining FDIs in LA are subject of explicit social opposition and conflicts and the real or perceived influence exerted by governmental political and economic attitude towards FDIs in general and towards the mining sector in particular. The questions will be phrased and ordered as to limit, as much as possible, a convergent retrospective sense-making that could biased the interviewees' responses (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) . The survey will include a clause of confidentially by which the identity of each of the respondents will remain anonymous.
This case study intends to expose the dynamics of the interactions that MNCs' natural resources based FDIs unleash and that, at least in most of the LA countries, frequently evolve into conflicts. Governments' political and economic attitudes with relation to FDIs, previous corporate ethical behavior -of which the SLO is a relevant component-and societies' needs, real or perceived, will collide whenever the discrepancies between them are improperly managed.
The ethical performance, social and environmental, particularly that of mining MNCs' FDIs, and the sustainability of their negotiated LSO, is an incessant process that impose firms to pursue and to attain the highest corporate standards; this valuable goal can only be accomplished if it is Social License to Operate buttressed by a global and persistent technological and managerial progress (Sharfman, Shaft & Tihanyi, 2004) .
A revision and analysis of two recent experiences may provide useful tools to enhance firms' knowledge and capabilities to face and enhanced their performance in future FDIs in which the SLO may be part of the sensitive issues that conform the context of the operation. At the same time, we intend to expose an unexplored -at least in the LA countries-area of corporate, governmental and social interactions, which may be of academic interest for further investigation.
Two cases' polar outcomes

Bajo de la Alumbrera
The Argentinean, nationally and provincially-owned, mining company Yacimientos Mineros Since Alumbrera's operation started, some 70 local health centers have been assisted and educational aids were provided to one hundred local communities as part of the firm's widely publicized Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) program (Asongu, 2007) . Notwithstanding,
